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Ljiljana Radenovic’s “Philosophy of my Faith” (2021) makes the valuable 
point that for a philosophical account of religious belief to be satisfactory it 
must adequately address what it is like to have religious belief. The challenge, 
Radenovic notes, is that contemporary philosophical debates about religion 
are at times different to, or have no serious interest in, discussions about 
what it is like to believe. This division needs to be bridged, but I think that 
the way how Radenovic goes about doing so is unsuccessful. It is therefore 
only fitting, due to my support of the method but disagreement with the 
conclusion, to write a reply which follows suit—let us conduct our own 
meditation on religious belief and then compare our conclusions with 
Radenovic’s … [please read below the rest of the article].  
 
Meditation on Religious Belief 
 
There are several puzzles which surround the question of God’s existence, and the one 
which we shall consider is that of belief. What is a belief in God like—must a belief in God 
be religious and what do we mean to mark by the term ‘religious’? To begin, let us make sure 
that we have the right sort of question in mind.  
 
We are not asking about God’s existence per se, but rather the belief in God’s existence; 
what is a belief in God like? The most basic answer is that a belief in God is an ordinary sort 
of belief—it is the assenting to the proposition which asserts the existence of that which 
‘God’ references—or in other words, to believe in God is to think that the proposition ‘God 
exists’ is true. If a belief in God is a belief of this sort, then the whole matter seems rather 
simple to resolve—a belief in God is a matter-of-fact belief that the object which ‘God’ 
references exists, and this is either factually true or false. But this lacks something which 
Radenovic’s article does so well to draw attention to—religious belief is not reducible to a 
series of propositional claims which you agree with. 
 
If I was asked whether a belief in God is reducible to the belief that the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason adequately establishes the existence of a necessary being upon which all 
contingent things have their existence accountable to, I would say yes and no. Yes, insofar as 
people do present the Principle of Sufficient Reason as an argument in favour for the 
existence of God and therefore as a reason for belief, but I also want to say no because 
Christ did not come preaching about necessary and contingent existences. My objection here 
is not as basic as the bible does not use this as a proof, but that a belief in God strikes me as 
something distinctly different to a belief in an answer to an equation, or an acceptance of an 
outcome of a formula, or the assenting to a proposition in a syllogism.  
 
Likewise, if I was asked whether a belief in God is reducible to Pascal’s Wager—that one is 
motivated to believe in God in hope (or fear) of potential consequences—I would again say 
yes and no. Yes, insofar as people do seem to find this compelling, but also no. There’s 








objection is not meant to be trivial, but instead a point about the nature, character and 
quality of what a belief in God is like. In my mind, it is a joke to imagine a person reading a 
Cosmological Argument and then falling to their knees and confessing their belief in an 
unmoved mover.  
 
My point is not that these arguments are false or that no one believes them, but that there’s 
more to religious belief than the mere acceptance of an argument’s conclusion, and the 
philosophical debate needs to recognise this. A person might say that they believe because 
they find the Principle of Sufficient Reason or the Ontological Argument convincing, but a 
belief of this sort lacks the depth, immediacy, and illusiveness which Radenovic describes. 
They are not quite the same, and I would argue, as Wittgenstein puts it, that even if I was 
presented with a compelling argument for the existence of an unmoved mover and believed 
that it was true, I would not for a moment say that I have a religious belief (Wittgenstein 
1966, 56). Radenovic’s article motivates me to push this intuition further—what is a religious 
belief like? 
 
Belief-That and Belief-In 
 
I would want to champion Price’s distinction between beliefs-that and beliefs-in, and in 
doing so highlight that Radenovic’s article begins with a reflection on her belief-in God and 
ends with a discussion about how those reflections apply to the philosophical debate about 
believing-that God exists (Price 1965). A belief-that is the familiar sort of belief that such 
and such is the case—I believe-that London is the Capital of England or that Russia is to the 
East of Germany; whilst a belief-in is more dispositional—I believe-in my child or my 
husband. The distinction is clear when the two miscommunicate, such as where I might tell a 
friend that I believe in them, and they might turn to me and say that I cannot know for 
certain whether they exist independently of my mind. There is debate about whether this 
distinction is merely semantic or whether beliefs-in are reducible to beliefs-that, but even 
then, there is a non-trivial point to make when we say that a belief-that London is the capital 
of England has nothing to do with emotions, attitudes or dispositions, whilst your belief-in 
your marriage has everything to do with emotions, attitudes and dispositions. A belief-that 
God exists might therefore be different to a belief-in God’s existence, and it is worth further 
exploration. 
 
There is no reason for why a person could not have a belief-in God as well as a belief-that 
God exists, and perhaps we might argue that the legitimacy of the former depends upon the 
presupposition of the latter. We are not as interested with whether belief-in is reducible to 
belief-that as we are interested with what this distinction brings to our understanding and 
study of religious belief, and even if belief-in God presupposes or is reducible to a belief-that 
God exists, we can nonetheless appreciate the connotational distinctions. Most notably, 
beliefs-that appear propositional and require grounding whilst beliefs-in are not as obviously 
propositional or in need for evidence. 
 
The sensibility of believing-that London is in England is proportional to evidence, whilst the 
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sense to speak of evidence in that way. A person might ask their partner to prove that they 
still believe-in their marriage, but a person cannot ask their partner to prove that their belief-
in the marriage is true or false. I am willing to say that a religious belief might be composed 
of belief-that and belief-in, but I am not willing to say that a person could possess a religious 
belief without also possessing belief-in. To the extent that there is something which it is like 
to be religious is the extent to which I am committed to saying that religious belief is more 
than belief-that.  
 
To express this, consider how some beliefs are broadly treated as being trivial (like the belief 
that there is an even number of hairs upon my head) whilst others are treated as being that 
meaningful that those who don’t grasp the meaning are described as having not grasped the 
belief (that God exists). This is captured by Phillips who asks whether the following two 
statements mean the same thing: ‘I know that Mars exists, but I don’t really care’, and ‘I 
know that God exists, but I don’t really care’ (Phillips 1967, 65–66). 
 
Phillips argues that we do not need to care about planets in order to account for what Mars 
is, what the consequences of its existence are and how we can learn these facts, but this is 
not the case when one speaks about God. One cannot ‘find out’ that God exists and shrug it 
off as a trivial matter of fact, as one can do with planets. If a person were to explain that the 
existence of God has only trivial consequences such that a belief either way doesn’t really 
matter, then we’d likely say that they have missed the point of the matter (Phillips 1967, 68–
69).  
 
Returning to Radenovic’s description of her faith, she makes it apparent that she had no 
decisive argument which proved the existence of God or that God listened to her prayers. 
Those sorts of concerns did not feature in her life, hence why her father’s comments left her 
unmoved. To her, the reality of God was so immediate and felt that it was unquestionable—
there was no place for doubt about it, there was no need for evidence to prove it, there were 
no beliefs-that but only beliefs-in.  
 
Irrespective to whether belief-in presupposes or is reducible to belief-that, I would go so far 
as to say that those who claim to have a religious belief-in God because of their belief-that 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason is successful are fooling themselves. They are mixing the 
terms of the discussion up, and the fact that they do not see this only reaffirms their 
blindness to the reality of religious meaning. What matters is the fact that Radenovic had a 
form of belief which was not concerned with proving the truth of the belief-that God exists, 
and if we wish to understand religious belief then we must engage with it in its own terms. 
To these ends—being an attitude or disposition which carries connotations of hope, 
confidence and motivation—beliefs-in are by nature non-trivial, without need for grounding 
in evidence, and relatable to Radenovic’s descriptions of her faith. This also holds when we 
consider prayer. 
 
The gap between believing-that God exists and believing-in God is not so large that it 
cannot be bridged, but it is helpful to perceive this gap being wider in some contexts than in 








point of prayer (there is, after all, an absurdity to saying that God does not exist whilst 
praying) but that is not to say that we pray to the degree that we think we could prove God’s 
existence (Winch 1977, 207). This can be applied to Radenovic, who writes that she once 
saw the point to praying when young, but lost sight of it in her late-twenties and early-
thirties. It is not that she stopped praying in consequence of being given a compelling 
argument against the truth of her belief-that there is a listening deity, in fact I can imagine 
people praying to God because their rational arguments which were taken as proofs of 
God’s existence have been undermined.  
 
Losing sight of the point of prayer is an aspect of losing one’s belief-in God (Winch 1977, 
207). Just as how we might say that a person no longer believes-in their marriage if they no 
longer see the point behind certain gestures and actions, so too do we say that a person no 
longer believes-in God when they no longer see the point to praying, lighting candles, and 
attending rituals. One does not stop seeing the point to picnics and evening walks in 
consequence of disproving the existence of their marriage, rather one realises that they no 
longer believe-in their marriage when they notice that they no longer see the point in it all.  
 
As odd as it might sound, I think that the person who prays because the Principle of 
Sufficient reason has convinced them of the likelihood that there is a listening deity is doing 
something less religious than the person who does not pray because they are convinced that 




The first part of Radenovic’s article reminds us of the immediate and yet illusive nature of 
religious belief, and this must be addressed in a robust philosophical account. Although we 
should apply this meditative approach to the more abstract philosophical debate, I do not 
think that the approach which is taken in Radenovic’s article is the right way to do it. The 
article outlines the philosophical views of David Hume, Wittgenstein, and D. Z. Phillips, and 
concludes that they lead to agnosticism or relativism which are deemed dead ends. My 
contention is that the article, perhaps for sake of brevity, provides a rather narrow and 
questionable interpretation of each philosophical view which unfortunately knocks the 
remainder of the article off course.  
 
The Devil in the Detail 
 
Two things stand out in Radenovic’s (2021) question:  
 
Is it the case, as Hume used to think, that our religious beliefs are of the 
same kind as any other empirical beliefs, and since we cannot find legitimate 
empirical evidence for them, the best thing to do is to discard them as 
irrational and simply be agnostics, if not full atheists (16)? 
 
Firstly, it is disputable whether Hume concluded that religious beliefs were the same as any 
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do is discard them as irrational. In “Of Miracles”, Hume reasons that the authority of 
Christian scripture is determinable to the legitimacy of the apostles’ testimonies which claim 
that Christ performed miracles which proved his divine status (Hume, 10.1).  
 
Hume argues that testimony can never suffice as sufficient evidence for a miracle, and if the 
rationality behind the belief that Christ was divine depends upon the belief that he 
performed miracles, then in virtue of doubting testimony we must also doubt his divinity. 
Therefore, if it is the case that Hume used to think that our religious beliefs are empirical 
and in need of empirical evidence, then we should expect him to conclude that these sorts of 
beliefs are irrational because they depend upon a form of evidence which can never hold up 
to scrutiny—but he does not reach this conclusion. Hume instead states that he is pleased 
with his reasoning because he thinks: 
 
[I]t may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to 
the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of 
human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; 
and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no 
means, fitted to endure (Hume, 10.40). 
 
It is difficult to balance Radenovic’s portrayal of Hume understanding religious belief as 
empirical, with Hume not only making room for faith but going so far as to call those who 
try to defend Christianity through human reason (including empiricism) ‘dangerous friends 
or disguised enemies’. This does not mean that Hume would agree with how I have 
described religious belief, but it does show that there is more to his understanding than what 
Radenovic’s article considers, and a similar thing can be observed in its portrayal of 
Wittgenstein.  
 
Radenovic’s article claims that Wittgenstein had what Malcolm and Phillips called a ‘fideist 
view’ towards religion; that religious faith has its own form of life and logic, and only those 
who possess it can understand the meaning of religious concepts and beliefs. Despite saying 
that she will leave it for Wittgensteinians to determine whether Malcolm and Phillips are 
correct to attribute fideism with Wittgenstein, Radenovic (2021) not only affirms that 
Phillips attributed it but spends the remainder of her article in response to it: 
 
[T]he immediate worry arising from this stance is that if science, religion, and 
other areas of human endeavour are independent, have their own “logic”, 
and can be understood only from within, they all necessarily have their own 
“truths”. This kind of compartmentalization of our human world and the 
resulting relativism do not sit well with our intuitions (16).  
 
We could sympathise with this worry if it were agreeable that Phillips was a fideist or 
attributed fideism with Wittgenstein, but it is difficult to reach this view because even in the 
text which is cited in Radenovic’s article, Phillips states that ‘Wittgenstein did not hold this 
view, and neither is it held by those influenced by him in the philosophy of religion’ (Phillips 








have ‘misgivings [which] are unjustified, do not follow from a proper reading of 
Wittgenstein's remarks, and take us away from the central questions which Wittgenstein was 
raising.’ (Phillips 1993, xi, 81). Radenovic might have only wanted to say that some 
philosophers understood Wittgenstein as a fideist which is addressed by Phillips, but it is 
incorrect to describe Phillips as either supporting or attributing fideism with Wittgenstein.  
 
It would be unreasonable to expect Radenovic to go into intricate detail about the 
complexities of Hume and Wittgenstein in such a brief article, but it is worth emphasising 
that the way how the article portrays them is disputable and by no means the default view. 
The remainder of the article responds to the worries which Radenovic has about how Hume 
supposedly leads into agnosticism and how Wittgenstein supposedly leads into fideist 
relativism.  
 
Radenovic suggests that we could avoid both Humean agnosticism and Wittgensteinian 
relativism if we were to strip religious belief of epistemological value, but this was quickly 
ruled out because doing so would render a great deal of talk about religious ‘truth’, 
‘knowledge’ and ‘facts’ bunk. Radenovic wants to avoid this noncognitive outcome, and so 
the question is rephrased to ask whether we can maintain the regulatory function of religious 
belief (belief-in) without rendering its epistemological value illegitimate or relativistic (belief-
that). The article’s solution is based on hinge-beliefs, hinge-commitments and social 
cognition, and although this likely fails to reach Radenovic’s desired ends, the whole matter 
can be easily avoided because this is not ‘the question’ of the philosophical debate but the 
outcome of the article’s portrayal of Hume and Wittgenstein, and as this is disputable and 
avoidable so too are many of Radenovic’s concerns. 
 
Hinge-beliefs ‘are the most basic general 'presuppositions' of our world views which make it 
possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational’, and therefore offer 
Radenovic two things: they provide a regulatory function within life and they can avoid 
empirical delegitimization because they are, under some interpretations, not only groundless 
by nature, but often presupposed by empiricism (Ranalli 2020, 4975, 4977). A belief, 
therefore, is either itself a hinge or it is something which presupposes a hinge, and so there’s 
two possibilities: religious belief is either a hinge or it is something which presupposes a 
hinge.  
 
Hinges should not be thought of as cognitive beliefs which possess epistemological value, 
but as noncognitive commitments which regulate our worldview. Consequently, religious 
belief would lack epistemological value if it was a hinge because there are no truth-
conditions for hinges—a hinge is what regulates and sets the conditions for whether 
something is to be deemed true or false. But if religious belief is not a hinge, then it lacks the 
regulatory function which only hinges possess. In effect, Radenovic wants religious belief to 
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A Way Forward 
 
We wouldn’t be in such a conundrum if religious beliefs were like ordinary beliefs, yet we 
face compelling arguments on all sides. There are plenty of people who tell us that they 
literally believe that God exists and have a range of arguments to prove it, and there are just 
as many, like Radenovic and me, who think that there is more to it than that. We need to 
think more about what it is like to be religious than what we currently do if our philosophical 
studies are to be successful, but the success of this endeavour also requires us to have a 
refined understanding of the philosophical debate. Building accounts around hinge-beliefs, 
hinge-commitments and social cognition may yet prove to be successful, but we must first 
ensure that they are built upon steadier foundations than what we find in Radenovic’s 
treatment of Hume and Wittgenstein. More work should be done on the difference between 
what it is like to believe-in God and whether it is rational to believe-that God exists, and it 
would not surprise me to hear that religious belief is composed of both just as how the 
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